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The notion of some kind of international society bound together by certain common rules is regarded as one of Grotius' major contributions to international law and a peaceful world order. But his argument had far less to do with what individuals or states owe one another than the right they have to punish each other in pursuit of selfinterest, not only in defending themselves against attack but 'proactively' , as it were, in purely commercial rivalries. chains of production that cross multiple political boundaries'
-as the juridical foundation of 17th century international public order. De Indis systematically formulates the 'metalanguage' of early International Law as both textualism and as a material historicism. Simply put, the Text 'translates' the operational requirements of the World-System (praxis) into the terms of Naturalist jurisprudence (theory). A central tenet of this book is that an extended critical exegesis of De Indis will uncover hitherto unrecognised similitudes between early modern and contemporary International Law.
I The Genealogy of the Grotian Heritage
This paradoxical effect, produced by the co-mingling of superficially antithetical tropes of transparent international legal order and anarchic statist violence, is magnified when one recalls that both legal language (or 'discourse') and praxis have, historically, repudiated the very conditions upon which De Indis is expressly predicated: organized violence and state-sponsored criminality as the basis of legitimate international transaction. It appears as though International Law, in order for it to speak as itself, as required by legal education, re-presents itself in a camouflaged or disguised form, suffering from the externalised neurotic systems of repression, conflict, and selective amnesia: 'legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death'; that is, state violence. Derrida has made this point explicitly, postulating violence as the visceral foundation of legal order.
There is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or regulative… Since the 4
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